Omitted Proofs in the Main Model
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that u . In the following, we derive the conditions for each equilibrium. Q denotes the total information, Π denotes the social welfare, ξ denotes the total objective privacy damage and ξ denotes the total perceived privacy damage. The superscript sq indicates the status quo.
(1) If u sq,in−out H|s < u sq,in−out L|s < 0, then no uncommitted user will prefer to join, implying the equilibrium s is s sq = 1−α (i.e., only committed users join). Substituting s = 1−α into u sq,in−out H|s < u sq,in−out L|s < 0, we get v < 2(1 − )(1 − α)λ L , which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Q sq =
(1−α)γ(1+ψ)v c , Π sq =
(1−α)γ(1+ψ)v 2c
[v − 2(1 − α + α)λ], ξ sq =
(1−α)γψθv c
, and
(1−α)γψv c , we obtain 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λ L < v < 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λ H , which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Q sq = , we obtain v > 2(1 − αβ)λ H , which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Proof of Lemma 2. First, it is easy to check that Π sq (v) is continuous in v.
(
Lemma 2 summarizes (1) through (5) above. If
, and (3) together yield
(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) together yield Π sq < 0 iff 0 < v < 2λ. The two conditions are equivalent to conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 2.
It is also easy to check that Π sq decreases in v only when Π sq < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. To obtain the equilibrium outcomes here, we follow the exact same approach in the proof of Lemma 1. Noting that the impact of a nudge is basically a linear reduction in v, we can easily obtain Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that the impact of a nudge relative to the status quo is decreasing v. By Lemma 1, the participation size, s, weakly increases with v in the status quo, so decreasing v would (weakly)
reduce the participation rate in the community. Similarly, by the proof of Lemma 1, the total amount of information and the total privacy damage both increase with v in the status quo, so decreasing v would reduce the total information and total privacy damage.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the the proof of Lemma 2, the social welfare in the status quo may decrease with v when it is negative, but the social welfare always increases with v when it is positive. So when the social welfare in the status quo is positive, imposing a positive nudge (i.e., decreasing v) would decrease the social welfare; when the social welfare in the status quo is negative, imposing a positive nudge (i.e., decreasing v) may increase the social welfare, but the maximum welfare is obviously zero, which is achieved by setting a sufficiently costly nudge, τ = v.
Proof of Proposition 3. When user i makes decisions about the four types of postings, we can define a Lagrange function as the following (ignoring the externality terms since they are not user i's decisions)
where κ is the Lagrange multiplier. The FOCs are:
Then we can easily derive: 
Note that u . It is important to note that the participation rate increases with the numbering of the five cases:
rate. We next derive the conditions (more importantly, the appropriate ranges for Λ) under which the best participation rate is (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) respectively.
(1) If u q,in−out H|s < u q,in−out L|s < 0, then no uncommitted user will prefer to join, implying the equilibrium s is s q = 1 − α (i.e., only committed users join). Substituting
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Note that Λ is a decision variable and Λ > 0. To ensure this equilibrium is the best 
Meanwhile, the condition u
. Noting the range of s q , we obtain
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure this equilibrium is the best one, v <
, a smaller Λ yields a larger s q . So, to maximize s q , Λ should be set infinitesimally close to zero, Λ = ι, so the maximum participation size s =
Λ = ι can maximize the participation rate, and the fraction of uncommitted low-type users who participate
. By Lemma 1, in this range of v, s sq = max{1 − α,
improves the participation rate relative to the status quo. , we obtain
, which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure this equilibrium is the
can maximize the participation rate, and only all uncommitted low-type users participate (s = 1 − αβ). By Lemma 1, in
< s and Λ improves the participation rate relative to the status quo; when 
to maximize s q , Λ should be set infinitesimally close to zero, i.e., Λ = ι, so the maximum participation size
rate: All uncommitted low-type users participate and the fraction of uncommitted high-type users who par-
so Λ improves the participation rate relative to the status quo. , then all uncommitted users prefer to join, implying in equilibrium
, we obtain cΛ 2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )λ H < v, which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure we are able to achieve this equilibrium, we must have
can maximize the participation rate, and all uncommitted users participate (s = 1). By Lemma 1, in this range of v, s sq = min{
< s and Λ improves the participation rate relative to the status quo; when v ≥ 2(1 − )λ H , s sq = 1 = s and Λ does not change the participation rate relative to the status quo.
Proposition 3 summarizes the above five cases and highlights the conditions under which quota can be used to improve the participation rate relative to the status quo.
Proof of Proposition 4. With an effective quota, Λ ∈ (0,
), all users will post up to the quota. And relative to the status quo, each individual posts less. So if an effective quota increases the total information posted in the community relative to the status quo, it must have attracted more users to participate in the community. However, this would never happen. We next show why it is the case.
First, given the participation size s, the total amount of information posted in the community under quota Λ is Q q (s) = sΛ. So equation (A.3) (i.e., a representative user i's net utility from participating in the community under quota Λ) can be written as
Part (i) in (A.4) is user i's net posting benefit under Λ and is less than
, meaning that any effective quota would make each user enjoy less net posting benefit relative to the status quo. Now if Q q (s) is increased relative to the status quo, then Part (ii) in (A.4) is larger than in the status quo, meaning that each user will suffer more net privacy cost. Then each user will unambiguously enjoy less net utility from participating in the community due to the effective quota, Λ, relative to the status quo (since Part (i) is smaller and Part (ii) is larger), which is in contradiction with the prerequisite that more users should participate relative to the status quo for the total information to increase.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We now derive the optimal quota to maximize social welfare, Λ * .
(1) When 0 < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − α)λ L , by Proposition 3, no quota can change the participation rate in the status quo. So in any quota, no uncommitted users will participate (labeled as Case A). In Case A, the aggregate user welfare is (Λ ∈ (0,
So the welfare-optimal quota is Λ * = ι and accordingly Π q * = −ι. With Λ * in place, no uncommitted users will participate and s q * = 1 − α.
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract a fraction of uncommitted low-type users to participate (labeled as Case B). In Case B, the requirement on
. In equilibrium, uncommitted low-type users are indifferent between participating and not participating. That is, u q,in−out L|s
where s q is the equilibrium participation rate and changes as Λ changes. Using this equality, the aggregate user welfare in Case B can be written as
Note that, in (A.6), 1 −λ
decreases in Λ. Case A is also achievable, but it obviously cannot do better than Case B.
So the welfare-optimal quota is also Λ * = ι and accordingly Π q * = −ι. With Λ * in place, only a fraction of uncommitted low-type users will participate and
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the uncommitted low-type users (labeled as Case C). In Case C, the requirement on Λ is
. The aggregate user welfare in Case C is
We can easily derive the welfare-optimal quota according to (A.7):
Case A or B is also achievable, but they obviously cannot do better than Case C. Note thatλ
, so the optimal quota in this case can be expressed as
The second case exists only ifλ
place, only all uncommitted low-type users will participate and s q * = 1 − αβ.
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the uncommitted low-type users and a fraction of uncommitted high-type users (labeled as Case D). In Case D, the requirement on Λ is Λ ∈ 0,
. In equilibrium, uncommitted high-type users are indifferent between participating and not participating. That is, u q,in−out H|s 
]. Therefore, we can derive the welfare-optimal quota according to (A.9)
(A.10)
), Case C, B, or A obviously cannot do better than Case D. So the optimal quota is Λ * = ι, and all uncommitted low-type and a fraction of uncommitted high-type users will participate and 
, the corner solution is not achievable.
Under
), consider the following. 
With Λ * in place, only all uncommitted low-type users will participate and s q * = 1 − αβ.
is ineffective. With Λ * in place, all uncommitted low-type users and a fraction of uncommitted high-type users will participate and
(5) When v > (1 − )λ H , by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is attract all the uncommitted users (labeled as Case E). In Case E, the requirement on Λ is Λ ∈ 0,
. The aggregate user welfare in Case E is
We can derive the welfare-optimal quota according to (A.12).
•
It is easy to check Λ * E is indeed globally optimal. So Λ * is expressed as in (A.13). With Λ * , all uncommitted users will participate.
(A.14)
We need to see if Case E is globally optimal. Under
), consider the following.
E is the corner solution and can be easily proved to be inferior to Case C. Analysis as in (4.1) would yield
With Λ * in place, only all uncommitted low-type users will participate and s q * = 1 − αβ. . With Λ * in place, all uncommitted users will participate and s q * = 1.
Appendix A in the main manuscript summarizes the above five cases. We present the optimal quotas separately according to the value of . We have also combined adjacent ranges of v under which the optimal quotas are common.
Lastly, it is easy to verify that except for conditions (4.2) and (5.2), all the optimal quotas identified above are effective. That is, Λ * <
. Also note that when the quota is ineffective (i.e., Λ =
the quota is equivalent to the status quo. In the process of searching for the optimal quota above, ineffective quotas have also been considered. So when the optimal quota is effective, it will always improve the welfare relative to the status quo. In conditions (4.2) and (5.2), which can be combined as
) and
and the optimal quota retains the status quo.
It is easy to verify that the participation rate in the community is weakly improved relative to the status quo. The aggregate privacy damage is ξ = ψθ 1+ψ Q. When the optimal quota is effective, by Proposition 4, it will always reduce the total amount of information in the community (i.e., Q), so it will always reduce the aggregate privacy damage.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 1, a positive nudge weakly reduces the participation rate relative to the status quo. Meanwhile, by Proposition 3, a quota can be used to improve the participation rate relative to the status quo in some ranges. So obviously, a quota weakly dominates a nudge in increasing user participation. Now consider welfare, we consider two cases according to the value of : •
), by Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, Π n * = 0 when 0 < v < 2λ and Π n * = Π sq when v ≥ 2λ. Meanwhile, by Proposition 5 and Appendix A, Π q * = 0 when 0 < v <λ and Π q * > Π sq when v ≥λ. So Π q * ≥ Π n * . Π n = 0) equivalent to an extremely harsh quota (i.e., Λ = ι and thus Π q = −ι). This is purely because we have assumed Λ = 0 to avoid some trivial discussion.
Section 3.3.5. Formal results about overlapping of participation-optimal and welfare-optimal quotas. When the community owner's objective is to maximize participation, by Proposition 3, a quota can be used to achieve this goal. We now examine when the welfare-optimal quota (Λ * ) overlaps with the participation-optimal quota (Λ ). Referring to Proposition 3 and Appendix A in the main manuscript,
, and thus Λ * ∈ Λ .
, and thus
(ii.6) If v >λ,
whenλ < v < 2(1 − )λ, and thus
Proof of Proposition 7. Given a free allowanceΛ ∈ 0,
, if user i does not post in excess of this Λ, then the equilibrium quantities will be the same as those in a pure quota. So, by Proposition 3, we have . So the total amount of information each user would post is
>Λ, then users will post in excess of the free allowance, otherwise they just use up the free allowance.
We now see, when users post in excess of the free allowance (i.e.,
, whether the composite policy will outperform the pure quota in terms of participation and welfare. Substituting the equilibrium quantities of information derived above back into equations (2) and (3) in the main manuscript, we can derive a representative user i's net utility from participating in the community conditional on participation size s:
We calculate ∂u
+Λ for later use in the proof. We next prove that the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than a pure quota.
The last term is user i's net utility in the pure quota. So each user would obtain less net utility from participating in the community under this composite policy than under the pure quota and thus this composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than a pure quota.
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract a fraction of uncommitted low-type users to participate and u q,in−out L|s
+Λ 2 > 0. Logic similar to that in (i) yields that low-type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community in this composite policy than in the pure quota. However, for the composite policy to improve the participation rate more than a pure quota, it should make low-type users obtain at least the same net utilitiy, which is a contradiction. So the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than a pure quota.
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the uncommitted low-type users. Obviously, ∂u c,in−out H|s /∂τ > 0. Logic as in (i) yields that high-type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community under this composite policy than under the pure quota. However, for the composite policy to improve the participation rate more than a pure quota, it should make high-type users obtain more net utility, which is a contradiction. So the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than a pure quota.
by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is
to attract all the uncommitted low-type users and a fraction of uncommitted high-type users. Moreover,
yields that high-type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community under this composite policy than under the pure quota. But for the composite policy to improve the participation rate more than a pure quota, it should at least make high-type users obtain the same net utility, which is a contradiction.
So the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than a pure quota.
(v) When v > (1 − )λ H , by Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the uncommitted users. So there is no way for the composite policy to improve the participation rate more than the pure quota.
In summary, the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate better than the pure quota. Now consider welfare. Given that the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate more than the pure quota, we just need to see if the composite policy can improve the welfare more than the pure quota when it produces a lower participation rate than the pure quota. Hhis is impossible because the welfare-optimal quota identified in Proposition 5, by construction, considers all the possible participation rates and then selects the participation rate that can produce the optimal welfare. In other words, if there indeed exists a lower participation rate that allows the composite policy to outperform the pure quota, the pure quota can also achieve it without the additional nudging and thus deliver a greater welfare.
We can also prove such composite policy will not increase the total quantity of information posted in the community when compared with the status quo. To do so, we only need to see, when users post in excess of the free allowance (i.e.,
, whether the composite policy will increase total information relative to the status quo.
User i's net utility in (A.16) can be written as
, implying each user still enjoys less net utility in this composite policy compared with in the status quo. Part (ii) in (A.17) is the net privacy cost user i suffers (Q c (s) is the total amount of information posted in the community in this composite policy). So the same contradiction seen in the Proof of Proposition 4 will occur here. Therefore, this composite policy cannot increase total information relative to the status quo either.
Proof of Proposition 8. Proposition 8 is evident from the discussion that accompanies it in the main manuscript.
Detailed Results in the Numerical Example and Extensions

Numerical Example
Here we explain how we derive users' posting quantities in the targeted nudge and quota mechanisms when "false positives" and "false negatives" are allowed. Denote the probability of "false positive" by p x and the probability of "false negative" by p y . Note that only detected "sensitive information" would be regulated by nudge or quota.
In targeted nudging, user i's net utility is u tn,in−out i|s
FOCs w.r.t this equation would give user i's optimal posting quantities under targeted nudging:
the values for τ under a targeted nudge and Λ under a targeted quota (see specific values in the main text).
We choose six different values of v. For each v, using all the fixed parameters, we can compute each user's optimal posting quantities according to the equations derived above. Then we substitute the optimal posting quantities back into each user's net utility function to determine their participation decisions. Finally, all the aggregate measures (i.e., total quantity of information posted, social welfare, and total privacy damage)
can be calculated once participation rate is determined.
Extensions
(i) Heterogeneity in friendship. We assume n i ∈ U [0, 1] and
. User i's net utility from participating in the community in the status quo (conditional on the total information posted in the community, Q sq ) is given by
Note that u Note also that the utility function in equation (A.18) increases with v. As v becomes sufficiently large, every user will get positive net utility and thus participate in the community, which implies θ o = 1. Now focus on θ o < 1, then the condition to solve for θ o is that the cutoff type has a net utility of zero:
The total quantity of information posted in the community in equilibrium conditional on θ o is given by .20) Combining equations (A.19) and (A.20) , we can derive the condition to solve for θ o : 
, all users will get positive net utility and participate in the community.
So we obtain Lemma 4.
Nudge
Note that the impact of a nudge relative to the status quo is decreasing v. So according to Lemma 4, implementing a nudge will (weakly) decrease the participation rate relative to the status quo. According to equation (A.20) , it is easy to verify that Q sq (θ o ) increases with v and θ o . That is, the total quantity of information posted in the community will decrease as posting benefit decreases and participation rate decreases, which are the impacts from a nudge. To examine the impact of a nudge on social welfare, we first derive the social welfare in the status quo: (similar to Figure 3 in the main text). As participation increases, the social welfare may decrease. Therefore, we have shown numerically that, when a nudge is implemented, the participation rate decreases, which may increase social welfare. This result shows that the effects of a nudge are similar to that in the main model.
Quota
We consider a quota of the following form:
, where f ∈ [0, 1] and
is the total amount of information user i will post by her own choice in the status quo. User i's net utility from participating in the community under the quota (conditional on the total information posted in the community Q q ) is given by u q,in−out i Focus on θ o < 1. The condition to solve for θ o is that the cutoff type has a net utility of zero:
The total quantity of information posted in the community in equilibrium conditional on θ o is given by
Combining equations (A.24) and (A.25), we can derive the condition to solve for θ o :
Now comparing equations (A.26) and (A.21), the RHSs of both equations are the same and increase with θ o . Note that (2 − f )v ≥ v (LHSs of the two equations), so the equilibrium θ o under a quota will be larger than that in the status quo. In other words, adding a quota to the status quo will increase the participation rate. This holds as long as the participation rate in the status quo is not full and there is room for improvement (i.e., v < (1
). The impact of a quota on the total amount of information posted in the community can still be seen by the dilemma highlighted in Proposition 8. As in the main model, a quota will decrease the total amount of information and hence the total privacy damage relative to the status quo.
The social welfare under a quota is given by .27) Due to the complexity of the model, it is challenging to derive the closed-form optimal quota by comparing Π q with Π sq . We thus resort to numerical analysis to examine the impact of a quota. We set Under all these cases, we discover the consistent result that, with an appropriate quota, the social welfare can be increased relative to the status quo. where λ i = φθ i − e − (1 − φ)ω has the same interpretation as in the main model. Then all the results in the main model can be easily replicated here. As we can see, the only difference is that ψ 1+ψ in the main model is replaced by φ here. That is because we conveniently capture the differences in the quantities of nonsensitive and sensitive information posted by a user through the cost-ratio parameter, ψ, which is also exogenously given. As a result, an exogenous and fixed fraction of the total amount of information posted by a user is privacy infringing. Therefore, ψ 1+ψ is equivalent to φ.
